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[L. A. No. 18818. In Bank. Feb. 23, 1945.J 
RICHARD BEWICK, Respondent, v. PEARL MARGARET 
MECHAM, as Executrix, etc., Appellant. 
[1] Decedents' Bstates-Completion of Decedents' Oontracts-Spe-
ci1lc Performance.-The superior court has jurisdiction over 
an action for specific performance of a decedent's contract 
during an administration of his estate, where the right to relief 
is doubtful. This is true notwithstanding the fact that former 
Code ~iv. Proe., § 1602, relating to dismissal of a probate 
petition without prejudice to a suit in equityl is omitted from 
Prob. Code. § 850 et seq., as the presumption is that the Legis-
[I] See liB Oi.l.:rur. 200, 206; 21 Am.Jur. 579, 888. 
McX. Dig. References: [1] Decedents' Estates, § 743; [2] Lanc1-
lord and Tenant, § 101(1); [8] Arbitration, § 5&; [4] Arbitration, 
§ 5; [5] Contracts, § 112; [6] Specill.c Performance, 148; [7] COn-
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lature did not intelld to traw;form that proceediug into one to 
determine controversies whether the cxC'cutor mllst specifically 
enforce the contract. 
[2] Landlord and Tenant-Option to Purchase-Assignment.-An 
option to purchase contained in a lca~c of land is a real CO\'e-
nant running with the land; and an a"sigllm~nt of the lease 
include~ the option. 
[3] Arbitration-Proceedings Under Code Civ. Proc., § 1280 et seq. 
-Code Civ. Proc., § 1283, allowing the court to appoint an 
arbitrator if one party has failed to make an appointment upon 
demand of the other, is applicable only if the parties have 
agreed to submit a contro .. ;ersy to arbitration within the mean-
ing of § 12RO. 
[4] Id.-Appraisements.-An option to purchase land which pro-
vides for determination of the price and terms of purchase by 
arbitration, if not fixed by future agreement of the parties, 
but which does not indicate that the arbitrators are to take 
evidence in a formal proceeding as a basis for their decision, 
shows that the parties intended an evaluation by appraisers 
as distinguished from an evaluation by formal arbitration. 
[6] Contracts-Deflniteness.-An option to purchase land provid-
ing for the appointment of third persons to ascertain the price 
is deflnite enough to give rise to a contract. (See Civ. Code. 
§ 1610.) 
[6a-6c] Speci1l.c Performance-Contract-Refusal to Appoint Ap-
praiser.-When the method of ascertaining the purchase price 
of land provided for in an option agreement became impossible 
of execution as a result of the optioner's refusal to appoint 
an appraiser, such refusal did not make the contract invalid 
or incapable of specific performance for want of certainty. 
In such case, under Civ. Code. § 1613. the court could make the 
appraisement itself. 
[7] Contracts-Interpretation-Terms Implied.-Each party to a 
contract has a duty to do everything that the contract presup-
poses that he will do to accomplish its purpose, and a duty 
not to prevent or hinder performance by the other party. 
[8] Id.-Breach-Prevention of Performance.-A party who pre-
vents fulfillment of a condition of his own obligation commits 
a breach of contract and cannot rely on such condition to 
defeat his liability. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 
Kern CountJ. Willia.m L. Bradshaw, Judge. Affirmed. 
[7] See 4 OaLJur. IO-Yr. Supp. (1943 rev.) 142; 12 Am.Jur. 765. 
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Action for specific performance. Judgment for plaintiff 
affirmed. 
Claflin, Dorsey & Campbell, Dorsey & Campbell, Allan 
Campbell and J. R. Dorsey for Appellant. 
Harvey, Johnston & Baker, T. N. Harvey and Carl John-
ston for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-J. J. Lopez leased real property in the city 
of Bakersfield to S. S. Lombard for the operation of an auto-
mobile supply and service station or other business, for a pe-
riod of ten years commencing July 1, 1929. The lessee was 
authorized to construct buildings and other improvements on 
the land and to remove them at the end of the term. The trial 
court found that the lessee spent $13,500 for structures on the 
land, relying on a provision in the lease giving him an option 
to purchase the land upon the expiration of the lease "at a 
price and terms then to be agreed on between the parties 
hereto, and if not agreed on then to be fixed by arbitration, 
each of the parties hereto selecting one arbitrator, and the 
two selected [sic] a third, which said arbitrators shall fix such 
purchase price and the terms under which the purchase may 
be made, but with the proviRO that on the matter of terms at 
least one-half of such purchase price shall be payable in cash, 
and the remaining half to be evidenced ~y promissory note 
secured by deed of trust, and to draw not less than the legal 
rate of interest." Any assignment of the lease and the option 
to purchase was subject to the lessor's written consent. Lom-
bard assigned to plaintiff his interest in "the indenture of 
lease" with the lessor's written consent. When plaintiff exer-
cised the option to purchase the land at the end of the term 
the lessor refused to sell. Upon the lessor's refusal to comply 
with his obligation under the option agreement plaintiff ap-
pointed an arbitrator to fix the price and terms of purchase; 
This arbitrator with two others fixed the purchase price and 
the terms for the payment of that part thereof that was not.. 
'payable in cash. On defendant's motion, however, the court 
vacated their decision on the ground that the arbitrator al-
legedly appointed by the lessor was not duly appointed by 
him. (In re Bewick, 49 Cal.App.2d 287, [121 P.2d 815].) 
Thereafter plaintiff renewed his effort to have the price and 
terms of purchase determined by arbitrators in the manner 
.... 
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provideu ill the agreemellt by reappointing the arbitrator 
whom he had formerly appoillted and demanding that defend· 
ant appoint an arbit rator. When defendant refused, plain. 
tiff brought this artioll to have the court fix the purchase 
price and decree specific performance of the contract, and 
offered to pay in cash the entire purchase price fixed by the 
court. The trial court fixed the price at $9,000 and ordered 
defendant to perform the contract. Defendant, 88 exeeutrix 
of the estate of J~ J. Lopez, appeals from the judgment. 
[1] Defendant contends that the trial court lacked juris-
diction to decree sprcific performance of a contract of a de-
cedent during administration of his estate on the ground that 
the probate court had exclusive jurisdiction of the matter. 
A demand for specific performance of a contract of a decedent 
by conveyance or transfer of property in the possession of the 
administrator or executor differs from a claim of a general 
creditor seeking satisfaction out of the assets of the estate. 
(Prob. Code, § 700 et seq.; Estate of Dutard, 147 Cal. 253, 
257 [81 P. 519); Mix v. Yoakum, 200 Cal. 681, 685 [254 P. 
557); Porter v. Van Denburgh, 15 Cal.2d 173, 177 [99 P.2d 
265]; Estate of Bailey, 42 Cal.App.2d 509, 511 [109 P.2d 
356); see 34 A.L.R. 385, 386; 21 Am.Jur., Executors and 
Administrators, § 348.) Under section 850 of the Probate 
Code, the probate court may make a decree "authorizing and 
directing the executor or administrator" specifically to per-
form a written contract of the decedent by conveying or trans-
ferring property to the person entitled thereto under the con-
tract. This section authorizes the executor or administrator 
under the supervision of the probate court to transfer title to 
property in fulfillment of a written contract of the decedent 
without joining the beneficiaries of the estate to whom the title 
has passed at the death of the decedent (see Prob. Code, § 300; 
Pomeroy, Specific Performance of Contracts (3d ed.) § 497). 
"This special statutory remedy conferring upon the probate 
court administering the estate jurisdiction to grant specific 
performance in eases where the right of petitioner in the prem-
ises is free from doubt . • • would seem to be a wise provi-
sion j it evidently tends to save the expense and delay that 
would follow a separate action in equity for a specific per-
formance." (Estate of Garnier, 147 Cal. 457, 459 [82 P. 
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of ordinary contracts where there is no real controversy as to 
the obligations of the respective parties, ... " (Pomeroy. 
ibid., p. 993.) Before the enactment of the Probate Code 
former section 1602 of the Code of Civil Procedure provided 
that if the probate court found that the asserted right was 
doubtful it must dismiss the petition without prejudice and 
that the claimant had six months after the dismissal in which 
to bring suit for specific performance in a court of competent 
jurisdiction. Since an intention of the Legislature to change 
the character of the proeeeding in the probate court does not 
appear by express declaration or necessary implication it must 
be presumed that the Legislature did not intend to transform 
the proceeding in the probate court to facilitate the convey-
ance or transfer of property during the administration of the 
estate into a proceeding to determine controversies as to 
whether the executor must specifically perform a eontract 
made by the decedent. (See County of Los Angeles v. Fris-
bie, 19 Cal.2d 634, 644 [122 P.2d 526]; Prob. Code, §852; 
lIB Cal..Jur. 206; see,'also, Raginsky v. Lawler, 313 Ill. 441 
[145 N.E. 189]; Church of Christ v. Beach, 7 Wash. 65 [33 
P. 1053].) 
[2] Defendant contends that the assignment of the lease 
by Lombard to plaintiff did not carry with it the option to 
purchase the land. The assignment named as its subjeet 
matter "the indenture of lease." The assignment of the 
writings by whieh a contraet is witnessed is the most common 
mode of transferring the eontract, and cannot be understood 
as having any other intention." (Blaheman v. Miller, 136 
Cal.. 138. 141 168 P. 587, 89 Am.St.Rep. 120].) Moreover, an 
option t.o purchase the land during or at the end of the term 
operates to the benefit of the lessee as such, for he may erect 
buildings or other structures without losing their use at the 
end of the term. and it is therefore settJed in this state that 
"an option covenant eontained in a lease is a real covenant 
running with the land." (Chapman v. Great Western Gyp-
sum Co., 216 Cal. 420, 425 [14 P.2d 758, 85 A.L.R. 917]; see 
Laffan v. Nt/fllee, 9 Cal. 662, 678 [70 Am.Dee. 678]; Hall v. 
Center, 40 Cat. 63; Standard Oil Co. v. Slye, 164 Cal. 435. 
442 [129 P. 589); 15 Cal.hRev. 56; 2 Tiffany, Landlord and 
Tenant, § 267.) The separate reference in the agreement to 
the lessor's consent to an assignment of the option right pre-
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tion to purchase without the lease. (See Matt v. Cline, 200 
Gal. 434, 450 [253 P. 718]; 15 CaLL.Rev. 56.) 
[3] Defendant contends that plaintiff failed to make use 
of the statutory remedy under· section 1283 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure to have an arbitrator appointed by the court 
when defendant refused to appoint an arbitrator and that the 
court could not fix a price when plaintiff had an adequate 
remedy to obtain the fixing of a price by arbitrators. Section 
1283 of the Code of Civil Procedure allowing the court to ap-
point an arbitrator if one party has failed to make an appoint-
ment upon demand of the other is applicable, however, only if 
the parties have agreed to submit a controversy to arbitration 
within the meaning of section 1280 of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure. Section 1280 requires that there be a controversy 
arising out of the contract or the refusal of one of them to per-
form the contract. [4] It was not contemplated by the op-
tion agreement in the present case that the arbitrators should 
decide any controversy arising out of the option agreement 
or the refusal of the parties to perform. Their sole task was 
to determine the value of the land and to fix the purchase price 
accordingly and the installments for the payment of the cred-
ited part of the price. "A reference to a third person to fix 
by his judgment the price, quantity, or quality of material, 
to make an appraisement of property and the like, especially 
when such reference is one of the stipulations of a contract 
founded on other and good considerations, differs in many re-
spects from an ordinary submission to arbitration." (Palmer 
v. Clark, 106 Mass. 373, 389; see, also, Luedinghaus Lumber 
Co. v. Luedinghaus, 299 F. 111, 113.) There is nothing in the 
agreement to indicate that the arbitrators were to take evi-
dence in a formal proceeding as a basis for their decision 
rather than their own opinion and judgment. "Submissions 
to determine values are of two kiI!.~:-1!rst, where the valuers 
are to examine the property and fix the value in accordance 
with their own opinion or judgment; second, where they are 
to afford the parties a hearing, and an opportunity to offer 
evidence, and are to adjudge the value upon a consideration of 
the evidence, as well as their own opinion. In cases of the 
first class, it is usually held that the agreement is not prop. 
erly a submission to arbitration and is not subject to the 
rules which govern arbitrators .... Church v. Seitz, 74 Cal. 
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ered as establishing this doctrine in this state. (See, also, 
Stockton etc. Works v. Glen Falls Ins. Co., 98 Cal. [557] 570 
[33 1'.633]; Foster v. Carr, 135 Cal. 86 [67 P. 43].)" (Dore 
v. Southern Pacific Co., 163 Cal. 182, 189 [124 P. 817J.) In 
Church v. Seitz, supra, where the agreement of the parties was 
similar to the present one, the court declared that the inten-
tion of the parties determined whether the property should 
be evaluated by formal arbitration or informal appraisal, and 
quoted from Brink v. N. A.·Fire Ins. Co., 5 Robt. (N.Y.) 123, as 
follows: "There is scarcely a day in which in commercial trans-
actions the valuation of property, or estimate of damages, is 
not intrusted to third parties, and no one has yet dreamed of 
looking upon them as arbitrations, and subjected to all the 
formalities imposed on them .. , with the paraphernalia of 
oaths, witnesses, and notices of trials. It is most frequently 
confined to the personal skill, knowledge, or experience, or 
even acquired information of appraisers." (P. 296.) (See, 
also, Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 174 Cal. 588, 594 [163 P. 993]: 
Rives-Strong Building v. Bank of America, 50 Cal.App.2d 
810, 814 [123 P.2d 942] ; 6 Williston on Contracts (1938 rev. 
ed.) § 1921 A; 17 Cal.L.Rev. 643; Sturges, Commercial Arbi-
trations and Awards, pp. 18-42.) In the present case it is 
clear that the parties intended not a formal arbitration, but 
an evaluation by appraisers whom they regarded as experi-
enced and familiar with the conditions in question. 
[5] Defendant contends that the option agreement was too 
indefinite to give rise to a contract upon the exercise of the 
option, but that if there was a contract it established the ex-
clusive method of ascertaining the price and terms of purchase. 
Since the plaintiff was willing to pay the entire price in cash 
the only question of uncertainty remaining concerned price. 
(See Restatement: Contract, § 370, TIlustration 1.) If the con-
sideration is executory its determination may be left to a dis-
interested third person. (Civ. Code, § 1610.) The option cove-
nant providing for the appointment of third persons to as-
certain the price was therefore definite enough to give rise to 
a contract. [t>a] The only question to be determined is 
whether defendant's failure to appoint an appraiser made the 
contract invalid or incapable of specific performance for want 
of certainty. (See Hardy v. Hardy, 23 Cal.2d 244, 247 [143 
P.2d 701]; Talmadge v. Arro'whead R. 00., 101 Cal. 367. 371 
[35 P. 1000J; Winebu1'uh v. Gay. 27 Cal.App. 603 [150 P. 
) 
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1003]; SaTina v. Pedrotti, 103 Cal.App. 203 [284 P. 472].) 
In the present case the contractual method of ascertaining 
the purchase price became impossible of execution, not as the 
result of circumstances beyond the control of the parties, aut 
because of defendant's refusal to appoint all appnliser, thus 
making impossible an appraisal as eontemplated by the agree-
ment. Defendant's refusal to participate in estahlishing the 
appraisement board was a violation of her contraetual obli-
gation to take the necessary steps to make the appraisement 
provision of the contract operative. [7] Each party to a 
contract has a duty to do everything that the contract presup-
poses that he will do to accomplish its purpose (Epstein v. 
Gradowitz, 76 Cal.App. 29, 32 [243 P. 877]; see Williston, 
Contracts (l9~7 rev. ed.) § 1293) and a duty not to prevent 
or hinder performance by the other party. (Tanner v. Title 
Ins. etc. Co., 20 Ca1.2d 814, 825 [129 P.2d 383] ; see Williston, 
op. cit., § 1293 A; 4 Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. (1943 rev.) 142.) 
[6b] By making the appraisal impossible, defendant pre-
vented the determination of the purchase price by the method 
contemplated by the contract. Defendant's obvious purpose 
was to make the contract inoperative and to prevent plaintiff 
from seeking specific performance after the price was deter-
:mined by the appraisers. [8] A party who prevents fulfill-
ment of a condition of his own obligation commits a breach 
of contract (A.lderson v. Houston, 154 Cal. 1, 13 [96 P. 884]; 
Pacific Venture Corp. v. Huey, 15 Cal.2d 711,717 [104 P.2d 
641]; Carl v. Eade, 81 CaLApp. 356, 358 [253 P. 750]; Rest., 
Contracts, § 315) and cannot rely on such condition to defeat 
his liability. (Pacific Venture C01·p. v. Huey, supra; Carl v. 
Ea.de, supra; 13 C.J. 647; 17 C.J.S. 966; 12 Am.Jur. 885.) 
[6e] Moreover, section 1613 of the Civil Code prescribes 
that "Where a contract provides an exclusive method by 
which its consideration is to be ascertained, which method 
appears possible on its face, but in fact is, or becomes, impos-
sible of execution, such provision only is void; ... " Under 
this section impossibility of ascertaining the price by the cOn~ 
tractual method does not preclude a court from giving effect 
to the contract, ascertaining the consideration in place of the 
arbitrators or appraisers. Determination of the value of the 
property is a common task of courts in condemnation, parti-
tion, and other proceedings. If equitable considerations sup-
port the position of one who seeks specific performance, par-
) 
) 
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ticularly if he has previously changed his position in reliance 
on the contractual right that he seeks to enforce, courts of 
equity will assume the task of ascertaining the consideration 
if it has become impossible of ascertainment by the method 
provided in the contract. Thus it was said in Kaufmann v. 
Liggett, 209 Pa. 87, 102 [58 A. 129, 134, 103 Am.St.Rep. 988, 
67 L.R.A. 353] : "the authorities well agree that equity will 
not compel an arbitration, and this upon the very good 
ground that the courts remain open to the parties, with better 
provisions for securing justice than are possessed by arbi-
trators, but that in case of renewal leases the weight of au-
thority clearly favors the view that the tenant in such a case 
has a quasi proprietorship-a right, merely lacking a valua-
tion-and that the grossest inequity would be worked, should 
he lose his right through a failure upon the part of the arbi-
trators to :fix a valuation. While, therefore, a court of equity 
will not undertake to compel an arbitration, which it cannot 
control, it will in such case make an appraisement itself, or 
direct it to be done by its own officer, and will thereafter en-
force specific performance of the contract upon the terms so 
found." While earlier English cases followed the leading 
case of Milnes v. Gery, 14 Ves.Jur. 400, in holding that courts 
would not fix the purchase price of land if the contract pro-
vided for its determination by arbitration and the arbitration 
had failed, that doctrine was not adopted in this country and 
has in England given way to the tendency of later English 
decisions "to consider these stipulations for a determination 
of the price by third persons, rather as matters of form than 
of substance; to construe them in such manner that they be-
come incidental only to the main object of the agreement." 
(Pomeroy, Specific Performance of Contracts (3d ed.) § 151.) 
In Ooles v. Peck, 96 Ind. 333, 339 [49 Am.Rep. 161J ,. where a 
lessee who had erected . a building on the land sought specific 
performance of an option agreement authorizing him to pur-
chase the land, the court referred to M~lnes v. Gery, supra, 
saying: "The doctrine of that case has, however, generally 
been followed by the courts of the United States, only in a 
limited· and restricted sense, and is mainly applied only to 
contracts for. reference in which, by the form and language of 
the stipulation, the mode of determining the price by values, 
on arbitration, is made an essential provision-in fact condi-
tion-to the validity of the agreement, and to cases in which 
) 
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the parties can be easily placed in statu quo, or where an 
aetion for damages can be made to afford an adequate remedy." 
'J'he doctrine -of these cases has been followed in this state 
(Stl'eichcr v. Ileimburgc, 205 Cal. 675, 679 [272 P. 290]; 
Glenn v. Bacon, 86 Cal.App. 58 [260 P. 559]; see, also, Secur-
ity 7'rust &; Sav. Bank v. Claussen, 44 Cal.App. 730, 734 
[187 P. 142]), and is supported by the weight of authority 
(see cases collected in Pomeroy, op. cit;, § 151; 30 A.L.R. 
572, 580; see, also, Maas Bros. v. Weitzman, 288 Mich. 625 
[286 N. W. 104]). 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., and 
Schauer, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied Mareh 
22, 1945. Carter, J., voted for a rehearing. 
) 
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